Paper presented at World Philosophy Conference, Platinum Jubilee
Celebration of Indian Philosophical Congress, Dec.28, 2000 to January 01, 2001, New Delhi, India.
Shakuntala
Singh*
I
What is it characterizes Indian philosophy as a distinct body of thought? Even if their concerns appear
diverse, their methods different, there is a centrality that pervades all these systems. This, according to most authorities,
is a predominant, if not constant, concern with liberation or moksa1, whether it is samkhya’s prakrti-purusa
viveka, Bhartrhari’s language-analyasis, Nyaya’s analysis of thought-structure, the Vedantin’s idealism,
the Buddha’s eight-fold path, the Jaina’s ethical realism – all these, following various different pathways,
are united in their conviction that they all seek liberation2.
Now, what
is this liberation? These are various nuances to the concepts of moksa, amaratva, mukti, kaivalya, nirvana, nihsreyasa,
apavarga (as also to a limited extent jivanmukta, samadhi and sanyasa) which we could study and analyse at a later
stage. That is not the point at issue here. The point at issue is: Is the concept of liberation not one that, in its essence,
is connected with the disembodied person or the incorporeal being, the non-material part of the self? And if the spirit stands
for that which is the disembodied self or the incorporeal being3, is not the concept of liberation a spiritual
one? I think we have to accept that it is so. In fact it cannot but be so. Liberation is a spiritual concept, spiritual as
distinct from, though connected with, the corporeal, material, physical world in which we live4. Hence we can say
that a spiritual concept like liberation is the predominant concern of most Indian Philosophy. It may not be that obvious
at a certain stage of their elaboration – for example, it may not appear to be the predominant concern of a Nayayayika
when he is engaged in tracing the intricacies of logic or a Grammarian when he is doing similarly with vakya. But it
runs as a strong under-current even in these thought streams. Proof for this, if proof be needed, is their continuous emphasis
that analysis, whether of logical structure or of language, is the pathway to perfection, release from bondage, and therefore,
liberation5.
Having understood the central importance of a spiritual concept in almost all Indian philosophies, let us go on to
another aspect of Indian life. Religion
What is it that characterizes religion? Religion involves dogma, creed, followers, belief in a divinity, God, after-life
etc. But there can be religion without God or belief in an after-life. There can be religion which is non-dogmatic in the
sense that it allows for reason and does not expect blind obedience to scriptural or canonical authority. Still a minimum
of dogma, with a group of followers and a creed are essential to religion.
But they are not characteristic only of it. They are necessary even for most political ideologies, for example. Even an element
of dogma and faith are essential for political ideologies. So it is not these that are its distinguishing characteristics,
although they do form part of religion.
If it is not dogma, faith,
followers, God, after-life etc. that characterize religion, then what is it that does? (By characterize we mean as serving
both to stress its essential characteristics as also to distinguish it from others.) We shall be led to the thought that every
religion has some characteristic concept that is other-wordly, non-corporeal, non-material – in other words, of the
spirit, the spirit as distinct from the body and the physical objects of this world. Religion may regulate the affairs of
this world, may be very much concerned with such regulation and the good life. But it bases such regulation on some spiritual
concept of what man’s existence and his state following it (call it heaven, hell, liberation, union with the divine,
whatever) is all about. The essence of religion, therefore, is spirituality. Now this spirituality can take various forms.
For some it amounts to belief in God, for others in an after-life, for someone else in karma, for others still
in heaven and hell, and for still others in moksa, liberation, nirvana, kaivalya, apavarga etc. All these can be subsumed under the broad category of spirituality.
Now the problem is as follows. The most important characteristic of Indian
philosophies we saw was their spiritual concerns. We however find that the most
important characteristic of religion also is spiritual concerns. Are we then
to believe, as a group of thinkers still believes, that the Indian philosophies are nothing but religion? And if it is nothing
but religion, can it be the proper concern of philosophy as an analytical discipline?
It can be the concern of philosophy as an analytical discipline? Can
therefore there be an Indian philosophy which has concepts to contribute in all the major disciplines commonly attributed
to philosophy – epistemology, metaphysic, ethics, aesthetics, language analysis etc?
Are not the attempt of present-day Indian ‘philosophers’ to show that Indian ‘philosophy’ does
have these sub-divisions only culling out stray strands of analytical thought in the all encompassing ocean of Indian religion,
the former always a part, and a subservient part, of the latter? Is not therefore
Indian ‘philosophy’ either only religion, or at most philosophy of religion?
There is nothing really new about these questions 6. In fact
they have been raised, and raised ad nauseum for some, in that only reflecting probably an identity-search that
characterizes most post-colonial societies. The obsessive concern with such questions
often approaches a hypochondriacal malady. This is so because the concerns, rather
than helping to get done with them and get on with further concerns, have helped to entangle and preoccupy the meanderer who
appears enmeshed in these questions for their own sake.
Be that as it may. We may say that different thinkers have tried to answer
this question in their own ways. But we could perhaps resolve this difficulty
by accepting that there is an essential difference between composition and method. By
composition I mean what goes to compose a certain system, its components, its subject matter. By method, I mean the means or instrument
one uses to compose or study these components.
That such differentiation is essential in the study of the Indian philosophies, as of most other branches of philosophy,
will be clear in a minute. Spirituality is characteristic of the Indian philosophies
as much as of religion is true as far as spirituality as a component of both is concerned. As regards the method used to understand or study this spirituality, religion and philosophy are
markedly different. Whilst religion would use the methods of prayer, rituals,
bhakti, belief etc. to achieve what it considers spiritual goals, the philosopher would use analysis, understanding,
conceptual clarification as his method 7. Ofcourse one can trace instances
where these appear commingled. But that is only proof that both philosophy and
religion are enterprises of man, and man is a composite being, not wholly analytic, not wholly believing, using both for different
occasions, and occasionally erring in so doing by mixing them up. That is of
course the reason why the philosopher as a man cannot be totally rid of methods that are non-analytic: this may be considered
his weakness as a philosopher, meaning thereby the strength of his philosophising would be indirectly proportional to the
amount of non-analytic thought process he allows in his thinking and convictions. The
more he allows for belief and faith, the more religious he becomes. The more
he allows for reason and analysis, especially in matters which can be only settled by faith, the less religious he is likely
to find himself. How probably should man, who is not only a believer but also
a analyser, for man who is not only a philosopher but also a living, breathing, overawed microcosm in this vast universe,
conduct himself and his enquiries into his own mysteries, as well as the mysteries of this world will have to be settled by
each one at his own personal, highly individual, plane; and settled only to appear constantly unsettled. But this much can surely be said. If philosophy as a branch
must be differentiated from religion, then its differentiation is possible only by the method it employs. And the mark of
a philosopher would rest in how far and how well he can use this analytical method to study the concepts that come within
his compass. It is not that the religious man may not also analyse. But his analysis
is always subservient to his predominant concern - that of justifying a transcendental
concern. For the philosopher, however, the analysis is not subservient to anything
– it may become the means to achieve transcendental concerns, as it does in the Indian philosophies where it is the
means to achieve liberation. But it is not subservient to it; it is not
its hand-maiden. If analysis is carried out, by a Nyayayika of thought structure
for example, properly, for its own sake, fully and totally, it would lead to nihsreyasa: it would lead to nihsreyasa
almost automatically – the end must follow. In this there is no need to
think, or believe, that understanding of the sixteen categories of Nyayasutra
1.1.1 is subservient to the attainment of the highest good.
In fact such an understanding of Nyaya is rendering religious meaning into the Nyaya text which amounts to corrupting
it.
For religion, on the other hand, every analytic concern is necessarily guided, nay limited, in this manner. In fact that is the reason why the man of religion limits his analysis, and limits the questionings of
those who come within his power, to impress upon them the futility of logical or analytic pursuits, which he considers impediment,
beyond a certain reasonable limit, to the attainment of liberation. The Nyayayika
and the Grammarian put no such limits or impediments to their analytic concerns. In
fact they firmly believe that the analysis of thought structure and language structure in all their nuances are the legitimate
pathways to achieving liberation; they would thus seek to further and further utilize the analytical method till they reach
their goal. (Ofcourse one can quote here numerous instances wherein logic and
reasoning have been criticized in Indian thought, in the texts of the Mahabharatha, Ramayana and Manusmriti,
for example; but they are obviously referring to use of logical method for improper ends, use of arguments not because they
lead to enlightenment either of the inquirer or his debater, but as means to put down of refute the superior thought content
of the other by dishonest tricks of debate 8
So, whereas for the man of religion, any analysis is subservient to his transcendental concern, for a philosopher his
analytical concerns are a means to achieve transcendental concerns. This differentiation
is quite clear-cut in thought systems like Nyaya and Grammarians, although it may not remain that clear-cut in some of the
more idealistic systems. But even there it should be possible to separate out
the religious from the philosophical concerns, if such a differentiation is considered necessary. In fact it may help both the Indian philosophies and religion.
For when both know their legitimate domains, good neighbourly relations and healthy give and take can follow. Good neighbours are neighbours, they give and take, but they know their boundaries,
and remain within them. They do not merge boundaries, or identities. This could very well happen with the Indian philosophies and Indian religion; and, come to think of it,
may be a worthwhile, nay necessary, enterprise.
Hence it is in their method that Indian religion and Indian philosophy differ. Although
the religious thinker may study and mouth philosophical concepts, he does so
within the predominant concerns of his religious belief system. Similarly although the Indian philosopher may study
and mouth religious concepts, he does so within the predominant concerns of his philosophical-analytic system.
Would it not therefore be better to characterize the Indian philosophies as distinguished not by their spirituality,
because their spirituality, rather than distinguish them from religion, makes them seem dangerously close to it? Would it
not be better to characterize them by its method, by the fact that they utilize analysis and reason which therefore
are what are their distinguishing characteristics? This would, moreover, further
underscore their affinity to the universal body of thought that goes in the name of philosophy everywhere, and would therefore
be doubly beneficial?
This is again a very important point which we must take up here. Ofcourse
philosophy is characterized by conceptual analysis. But it is philosophy
that is characterized. When we add the word Indian to the philosophies, we are adding a componential word, a word that seeks to qualify what the subject-matter of their philosophies has
to be. In other words, in the two words Indian and philosophies of the
concept Indian philosophies, if the
word philosophies stands for the
analysis of concepts, the word Indian stands
for the components or subject-matter
of such analysis. And what, as we saw, was the essential characteristic of this component or subject-matter in the case of
most Indian philosophies? It is spirituality. Whether we like it or not, whether we care for spirituality or transcendental
concerns or not, whether we are theists or atheists, we cannot escape this conclusion (which is probably why all Indian Philosophers
are not Indian philosophers. See Karl Potter, 1985, in this connection)9. We therefore cannot but be led to the conclusion that most Indian philosophies’
distinguishing characteristic is their involvement with the analysis of spiritual concepts. By undertaking analysis they differentiate themselves from religion. By tackling
spirituality, however, they manifest their affinity to it. This diversity of perception is to be grasped and understood.
Once this is done, questions like: Are Indian Philosophies
philosophy at all, or are they religion? Are they spirituality? Are they only a philosophy of religion? - become answerable.
Indian philosophies are philosophy because they analyse concepts, concepts that go to form philosophical systems which include
epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and theory of value, philosophical method, aesthetics etc. They are not religion, because,
although they tackle spirituality, they analyse it, do not only accept it as part of a belief system. They are spirituality
in the sense that their subject matter is spirituality. They are not spirituality in the sense of using the method of a spiritual
saint or monk - of prayer, bhakti, rituals, meditation on or communion with a supreme power or deity etc. Are they
only philosophy of religion? They are philosophy of religion, for they analyse the concepts that go to form religion. But
they are not only philosophy or
religion, for although they deal with spirituality which is their dominant characteristic (as it is of religion), they analyse
it, and while so doing tackle all the various facets of man’s cognitive enterprise that are available to him – the empirical, the ethical, the aesthetic and the metaphysical. The spirituality is pervasive, but it is not all. It is often
times only an under-current and then likely to the forgotten. In fact it can
even at times not be given any consideration, like for example when discussing the technicalities of a logical argument of
Nyaya or the linguistic analysis of Bhartrhari. But the moment we extrapolate from this and say that this is all there is
to Nyaya or Bhartrhari, all the rest being mere window-dressing, we err in taking the part for the whole, and lose our grasp
over the essential component of this distinctive style of philosophising.
II
Having now disposed of this point for the present let us come to the second important question, which is linked with it. What
shall we do with the Indian philosophies? Shall we allow them to retain their pluralistic thrust, a pluralism that appears
heterogenous but is sustained by a homogenous substratum of spirituality? Shall we allow the diversity of their concepts,
their belief-systems and rationalities to manifest themselves in all their splendour? Or shall we attempt to extract from
this plurality a homogenous substratum and reject all the residue? And if such a homogenous substratum has to be extracted,
shall it be its spirituality that shall become our concern or its analysis? (10)
The question here is apart from our justification or ability to undertake an enterprise like this,
whether we are really sure what is this homogenous stratum that we seek to extract. The question is of clarity of concepts.
If we are to assume that the homogenous substratum of Indian philosophies that must be salvaged from the plethora of anarchical
mushroomings is the analysis of concepts wherever they occur --
Samkhya, Nyaya, Vedanta, Mimamsa, Carvaka, Jaina, Buddhist, whatever -- we may be able to extract a homogenous substratum and reject all the residue all
right. But though this substratum appears homogenous, it will be so only from a certain view point of philosophy -- that concept
of philosophy which considers both the domain and the method of philosophy to be necessarily restricted
by the analysis of concepts. That philosophy is a cognitive enterprise is not to he questioned. But cognition is a method,
it is not the subject-matter of analysis. At least not the only subject
matter of analysis. The subject matter of analysis can be as varied as the
thought expanse of the human mind. In this subject matter, what characterizes the Indianness of thought
cannot but be brought into that school of cognitive enterprise that goes by the name of Indian philosophies. And that Indianness
of thought is its spiritual concern.
Let me try to put the case a little differently. If one wishes to concentrate on the analysis of concepts
wherever they occur in the Indian philosophies, we give the analytical part supreme importance and consider ‘Indian’
as only a geographical concern, That is, a thought is Indian purely because it originates from a geographical area,
India. We need not give it any greater distinctness purely because it originates there. If it has any distinction, anything
worthwhile, we will no doubt discover it as we analyse all the concepts that it stands for, and sift the chaff from the grain as we do so. We need consider
Indian as of no greater value that this.
Now such an approach to the Indian philosophies would be anathema to one who would want to consider
Indian not only from a geographic but also from a cognitive context. For him, Indian thought is the thought
that originates in the Indian context. The thought, the context
mind you, and not only its geographic with its important origins; with its important and distinguishing characteristics which
cannot be separated from its geography except artificially, which artificiality itself landing one into error unless one accepts
that it is an artificial arrangement. Not only accepts but is constantly in the know that this arrangement, even if acquiesced
in, is for a temporary purpose, to concentrate solely on the technicalities that preoccupy one at a certain moment. If from
such a temporary arrangement, the temptation to generalize and identify the artificial itself with the real is ‘developed,
the whole analysis that follows can be vitiated and lop-sided. Thus, Indian philosophies are not only analysis of concepts
that originates in the Indian sub-continent. It is analysis of those facets of Indian thought that characterize it,
make it significant and also serve to identify and distinguish it from all other thought streams. The Indian is necessarily
only geographical for one, the Indian is necessarily cognitive for the other.
The question now is: which of the two approaches is proper, or better? If one realizes the
reasons why one adopts a certain approach to the Indianness of the Indian philosophies, both approaches have their points
of relevance. Those who consider Indian only geographically will be able to extract the analytical substratum and will
best help to correlate it with the analytical substratum pervading elsewhere. Those who believe in the concept Indian as cognitive
necessarily will be best able to identify and articulate the distinctive thought streams that signify the Indian philosophies
and steer their thought pattern, as well as those of their followers, on a path of pluralistic heterogeneity. So both approaches
can be proper if they retain this perspective and know at what stage they become irrelevant. They become irrelevant, for example,
when the analytical minded attempts to do what comes almost naturally with the acceptance of analysis -- to
reject the other way of doing philosophy. Similarly the cognitive minded about the Indian philosophies become irrelevant when
they reject the analysis that the conceptual minded can present, perhaps better than they themselves. For the student of the
Indian philosophies who would want to do both, a continuous guard about where he remains true to which concern, conceptual
or cognitive, and where he is able to do the same about the other researchers who he comes face to face with, should be the
touchstone on which the worth of his philosophizing need be judged.
However, one more question remains. When we began our discussion on what should we do with the Indian
philosophies, we of course wanted to know what to do with its pluralistic thrust or the attempts by some to extract a homogenous
substratum and reject the residue. But before that we had also considered a question whether it would be better to characterize
the Indian philosophies by their method, by the fact that they utilize reason and analysis which therefore underscore their affinity to the universal body of thought
that goes in the name of philosophy everywhere. Or, to put the same question differently, is not there a commonality to man’s
cognitive enterprise? What is it that is therefore common to all philosophies everywhere? Is it not the analysis of concepts
that is common to them all? Should we not therefore be concerned with a similar analysis of concepts in Indian thought to
highlight the essential one-ness of all world thought, or at least of a world-view of all philosophies?
Such questions we would realize again take us back to the earlier paragraph. They are legitimate parameters
for a type of philosophy, the philosophy we shall identify as conceptual, and must indeed be furthered within its own parameters
and domain. But it is improper to consider it the sole, or only, method of philosophizing. That would amount to application
of universal principles out of context. It may be the sole, or only, method of
philosophizing suitable for oneself, or those who believe that this way of philosophizing best helps them to articulate their
legitimate concerns. But that can be their concern, and the concern of their philosophizing. It cannot become the sole, or
only, concern of philosophy itself. For there are as many approaches to philosophy,
even the Indian philosophies, as there are cognitive shades and awarenesses. This we shall label the cognitive approach
to philosophy. The only criteria that should he strictly adhered to by all shades of thought is that though they seek to legitimize
their awareness, they do not necessarily delegitimize other awarenesses,
unless
they can be conceptually so refuted. And during such conceptual refutation, the attempt cannot be only to highlight one’s
own strong-point. It should also be to highlight the strongest point of
one’s opponent, and then prove how the opponents’ strongest point also does not stand critical scrutiny. The classical
way in which purva-paksa was supposed to be represented. This alone will help one to steer clear from mouthing those
of our cognitions that are based on our needs and our biases, which a philosopher must continuously guard against, and steer
clear of. So,
one may say that whilst, on the one hand, a conceptual exercise is useful, nay necessary, to articulate or believe that that
level is the only level -- and not only
the only level, to believe that it alone characterized what is philosophy (rather than saying it characterizes one’s
brand of philosophy) which therefore negates that there can be different, and equally legitimate ways to philosophizing --
this is the error of generalizing from particularities and partial convictions. In our concern with
method, we cannot forget that a cognitive enterprise involves both a method and a subject-matter. Accepted, it is the method alone that the philosopher has, and therefore he is that much more likely to
give it primacy. But that is all the more reason to beware of his subjectivities. He
must remember that in any cognitive enterprise -- which
philosophy definitely is -- he must utilize
his method on a subject matter. This subject matter exists, is independent of his method, and in an objective world, and he
cannot therefore deny its existence, or allow it to be swallowed up by the perpetually unsatisfied appetite of conceptual
analysis. His attempts at stressing the primacy of method should not become a means of denying the existence of a subject
matter that exists apart from it. Whenever he does so, he transgresses the limits of his calling, converts a cognitive
enterprise into an affective one, and cannot but find himself indulging in intellectual dishonesty, whether unconsciously
or otherwise.
Hence, although the instruments are with the philosopher, the subject matter is given to him by the
particular spatio-temporal canvas on which he works. This canvas, in the case of Indian thought, happens to be spiritual concepts
as much as the mundane ones.
The characteristics of this canvas are clear when we realize that whilst the Nyayayika for example talks of pramana prameya
and its nuances, he has as his goal not only its analysis, but through its analysis the goal of supreme good -- nihsrevasa. And further on to apavarga – final release. This analysis is important, true. But this is only a partial truth. This analysis is also important
as a step, a stage in the final liberation a Nyayayika seeks through the analysis of the structure of thought. Which is
what Nyaya is all about.
Unless we accept this as a legitimate understanding
of the Indian philosophies, the over-riding
spiritual concern of all the Indian darsanas (11) will fail to make sense to us. Our attempts at
extraction of homogenous substrate will continue to include all the considerations which land us into error, and which need
not do so; even if the activity of such extraction has to continue. And
it is only when we understand this distinctive
feature of the Indian darsanas that we will be able to acknowledge the spiritual
concern of a Nyáyayika as legitimate, in fact as legitimate as his concerns with the analysis of the
sixteen categories. Then alone will Gautama’s Nyayasutra
1.1.1, for example, in which the understanding of
the sixteen categories is supposed to lead
to nihreyasa as the supreme good, and any attempts at further subdividing a ‘supreme’
good, whether into drsta or adrsta or as different from apavarga, will stop assuming as great a significance to prove the supremacy
of analysis as it may have earlier seemed. (12)
Notes and
References
- “Philosophical system
building in India is almost invariably connected by its creators with the gaining of perfection, which
has various names in Indian thought but
which we shall here call regularly ‘liberation’”. Karl H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies,
Vol. II, p 18, 1977, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.
- In this connection it would be better to record here two contrasting views on
Nyaya and Vaisesika. Ingalls, for example, believes, “It has often seemed to me that the teachings of the early
Nyaya might be called a philosophy of man rather than an exposition of logic”, quoted in Karl H. Potter, op. cit.,
p 19. Diametrically opposite is the thought of Faddegon who says that the Vaisesika “owes its
origin to a purely theoretical attitude
of mind and not to the craze for liberation which dominates nearly
all forms of Indian thought”, (Potter op. cit., p 18); or the view of Daya Krishna, ‘... many schools
of philosophy have literally nothing to do with moksa. Nyaya, Vaisesika and Mimamsa would predominently
come within this group”, (Potter,
op. cit., p 19). Faddegon and Daya Krishna are answerable
to how the concepts of nihsreyasa and
apavarga come to lay the foundation of the Nyaya systems since they are stressed right in Nyayasutra 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 respective1y. We shall reserve a detailed analysis of both
for a later stage.
- Spirit is the “animating
or vital principle of person or animal ... disembodied
soul, incorporeal being …” See J.B. Sykes, “The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, VII
Edn, 1982 (Reprinted 1985), p 1023, Oxford Uni. Press, N. Delhi. Of course spirituality is also understood
differently. For example, Daya Krishna writes, “A philosophy is usually characterized as ‘spiritual’ or ‘non-spiritual’ because of the way it
conceives of the nature of ‘reality’ and not because
of the manner in which it conceives of the ultimate or highest ideal of man. It is
its answer to the question about the reality of matter that determines whether a philosophy is to
he considered ‘spiritual’ or not, and not its answer to the question about the supreme end which human beings ought of
pursue.
“Thus a philosophy would not be entitled to be called ‘spiritual’ if it posits as the highest
or ultimate goal for man the freeing of himself or itself from the bondage of matter or the involvement in the embodied state and all the problems that it involves.
Rather it would be entitled to that title if and only if it denies the reality of matter and argues for the ultimate reality
of only conscious ness or that which is more akin or analogous to consciousness in our experience then of what we call matter”.
See his “Indian Philosophy and Moksa: revisiting and old controversy”, JICPR, 11:1, 1984, p.52. Now
this is an extraordinary understanding of the concept ‘spirituality’. It means that for something to be called
spiritual not only should it involve affirming of a disembodied state but denial of matter and its reality. The reason that
prompts such an understanding is probably to present the exact opposite of a materialist paradigm. The materialist not only
affirms the presence of matter as real, he simultaneously goes to great pains to deny that which is of the spirit. In contrast,
therefore, the spiritual should not only affirm that which is of the spirit but deny that which is off the matter. Now, of course, such polarization would be possible
only in the case of absolute materialist or absolute spiritual systems. For example, the Carvaka system on the one hand and
the Buddhist idealism on the other. (Potter, 1985, in fact interprets Daya Krishna’s understanding of spiritual as “what
we more normally call ‘idealist’, one who denies the mind- independent reality of matter”,
rather than “in the more common sense of one who recognizes supernatural forces beyond our understanding (p. 148; see
note 10). In most other systems, spirituality is a component, just as matter is another, as also manas, antahakarana, jiva,
atma and sarira. The system is spiritual insofar as it has a formulation to offer about the disembodied self. But
insofar as it has also a formulation to offer about objective reality and its existence aside and apart from the disembodied
self, it reflects non-spiritual concerns. In being concerned with non-spiritual concerns, it does not have to deny spirituality.
Non-spiritual is not equal to denying spirituality. All it means is that the focus of attention at that particular moment
is matter. At a certain other stage in thought, the focus may be on spirit when
the thought would be categorized as spiritual. Nyaya, for example, because it tackles spiritual concepts like nihsreyas
and apavarga is spiritual. But Nyaya is also realist insofar as it allows for objects of knowledge in the material
world and the methods to understand these objects of knowledge. There is no reason to believe that
just because it is spiritual with regard to one concept it cannot be realist with regard to another. In fact any complete philosophical system cannot but deal in concepts
both of the matter and the spirit. Hence spirituality need not deny matter, just as materialism need not deny spirit. Wherever
they in fact do, they transgress their legitimate parameters.
- In the light of our foregoing discussion, liberation is a
spiritual concept distinct from — but
not denying — the physical world in
which we live. To be distinct from you I do not have to deny you.
- For example the very first two sutras of Gautama’s
Nyayasutra say: “It is knowledge
of the real essence (or true character) of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment
of the Highest Good...” (i.e. nihsreyas), 1.1.1. Also, “There is a cessation of each member of the following
series — Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect
and Wrong Notion —
the cessation of that which follows bringing
the annihilation of that which precedes
it; and this ultimately leads to Final Release”, (i.e. apavarga) 1.1.2. See ‘The
Nyaya-sutras of Gautama’ by
M.M. Ganganatha Jha, Vol. 1, p 37 and 83, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1984. Similarly, Bhartrhari in his Vakyapdiya 1.1
is the first grammarian to systematically equate Brahman
(the Absolute) with language (sabda), going on to argue that everything else arises as a manifestation of this one Sabda Brahman. Similarly the Rg Veda 1.164 states in its Asyavamiya
Hymn that the ultimate abode of language (vac) is Brahman. Moreover Rg Veda
1.164.10, 41 and 45, mention that three quarters of language remains hidden in a cave, while the fourth part fashions creation.
See also, K.A. Subramania Iyer, ‘Bhartrhari on vyakarana as a Means of attaining moksa’,
Adyar Library Bulletin. Brahmavidya, 28, 1964, p 112—131. Also, C. Ramachari, “Renunciation,
the final Import of the Satakatraya of Bhartrhari,” Jr. of Mysore Uni, 18, l958-59, p 13-20.
- A recent article that raises such issues is K.J. Shah’s ‘Philosophy,
religion, morality, spirituality: some issues’, JICPR, VII: 2,
1990, p 1-12.
- That this is so can be illustrated in Nyaya, for example, Gautama’s
Nyayasutra 1.1.9 considers apavarga
i.e. final release itself as
a object of cognition, along with soul, body, sense organs, Things, Apprehension, Mind, Activity, Rebirth, Fruition and Pain
(see Jha, op. cit, p 210).
- See, for example, Manu, Adhyaya
2, verse II, wherein he enjoins excommunication of those dvijas or twice- borns who disregard the Vedas and Dharma-sutra relying
upon the support of Logic (hetu-sastra).
Similarly Valmiki, in the Ramayana (Ayodhya Kanda, Sarga 100) criticizes those of perverted intellect (durbuddhaha)
who indulge in the useless frivolities of debate and logic (anviksiki). Vyasa in the Mahabharata (Santiparva, Adhyaya 180) tells of the repentant Brahman who, addicted to tarka-vidya and anviksiki, revi1ed and opposed priests in arguments about Brahman, who was an unbeliever
and doubter of all who thought himself
a pundit. Actually he was a counterfeit pundit, since he was a rationalist and critic of the Vedas. He is referred to as nastika,
sarvasańki, murkha etc. Vyasa, again, in another passage in the Shantiparva (adhyaya
246), warns the followers of Vedanta against communicating their doctrines to a believer in tarka-sastra.
- Karl H. Potter “Are all Indian philosophers Indian philosophers?
J1CPR, Vol. 2:2, 1985, p 145-149. His last paragraph is worth attention,
“The term ‘Indian philosophy’ as darsana becomes inapplicable,
however, when addressed to enquiries, such
as are standard nowadays in India,
in which the entire world view
of karma, samsara and moksa is clearly not in point. While such enquiries may well be
philosophical and may be carried on by Indians, they do not constitute Indian philosophy as that subject has been understood in the literature on Indian philosophy.
But then, ‘American philosophy’ meaning pragmatism,
transcendentalism and other peculiarly American
contributions is a different use from
‘American philosophy’ meaning anything philosophical carried out by an American. I am
an American philosopher, but probably not an
American philosopher Can’t Daya be happy being an Indian philosopher who is not an Indian philosopher?” (p. 149). Voila.
- The essence of the Karl Potter - Daya Krishna controversy is this attempt to guide
the Indian philosophies “on a course of pluralistic heterogeneity or seek to extract a homogeneous substratum and reject
all the residue”. See, Ajai R. Singh and Shakuntala A. Singh’s ‘A Peep into man’s histority: the lessons
for today’, JICPR, Vol VII : 3, 1990, p 23-.46
quote on p 24. The attempt being made here is to carry forward this thought and analyse its
implications. Those who would want to follow the recent articles that reflect this controversy could profit by beginning with
Karl H. Potter’s chapter on ‘Theory of Value’ in Encyclopedia of India Philosophies Vol. II, p 19-37, op. cit., then go on to Daya Krishna’s,
‘Indian Philosophy and Moksa’, op cit. which severely criticises Potter’s
position, to which the latter offers his rejoinder in the form ‘Are all Indian Philosophers Indian Phi1osophers’,
1984, op.cit.
- The word ‘darsana’ is specifically used
here to stress that most of the Indian philosophical corpus is darsana i.e. undertaken in the service of liberation from karma and samsara (see
Potter, 1985, op. cit., p 145)
- A significant attempt at differentiating between apavarga and nihsreyas,
wherein the latter has a wider meaning than the former and includes it, “the
state of liberation being merely one of the kinds of nihsreyasa,” is made by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya
in an All India Seminar on “What is Dead and what is Living
in Indian Philosophy,” Andhra University, 1975 (Quoted by Debiprasad Chattonadhyave in his introduction to Nyaya: Gautama’s Nyaya-sutra with Vatsyayana’s Commentary (Tr. by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Indian Studies, Calcutta, l892).He then goes on to differentiate between drsta
and adrsta-nihsreyasa, wherein the author believes that in Nyayasutra 1.1.1 Gautama is concerned with drsta nihsreyasa alone, while it is adrsta nihsrevasa
which can be considered synonymous with apavarga, if at all. Also worth noting is Chattopadhyaya’s contention that the concepts of nihsreyasa and apavarga
in 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.9 are “insertions of the metaphysics of liberation in our text (i.e. Nyayasutra
(that) violently go against the spirit of the philosophy”, (p ixii), the person
responsible being Vatsyayana. This view obviously subscribes to the school of thought that Nyaya, and such other ‘secular’
disciplines, have nothing to do with metaphysical ‘concepts like Moksa. He even does that with Yoga’s
samadhi concept which he quotes in the same ‘Introduction’ (p. lvi), “we are aware that many Indian philosophers believe in it (i.e.
Samadhis), though there are others like the plain-speaking materia1ists and the Purva-mimamsakas to laugh at
it as some kind of humbug.”
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